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RESPONSE

FRAUD ON THE MARKET: AN ACTION WITHOUT A CAUSE

†

AMANDA M. ROSE

In response to William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political
Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (2011).
INTRODUCTION
1

In The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, Professors William
Bratton and Michael Wachter argue that it is time to cut down the in2
famous “judicial oak” that is the fraud-on-the-market class action
(FOTM, to use their lexicon)—time to stop the pointless pruning, and
grind the stump itself. They suggest that the SEC act as arborist, eli3
minating through rulemaking the Basic Inc. v. Levinson presumption
of reliance that makes FOTM possible, as part of a grand bargain with
Congress over the agency’s budget. Coupling the elimination of
FOTM with a step up in the agency’s enforcement resources, they argue, would mitigate any reduction in fraud deterrence that might
4
otherwise result. Should this approach prove infeasible, the authors

†

Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the
Market, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 69.
2
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (referring to
the private Rule 10b-5 cause of action as a “judicial oak which has grown from little
more than a legislative acorn”).
3
485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
4
Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 149.
1
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would give corporations the choice to opt out of FOTM pursuant to a
5
federally mandated shareholder vote.
Bratton and Wachter build a compelling case against FOTM and
in favor of stepped-up public enforcement efforts, efforts targeted at
individual wrongdoers rather than the corporate enterprise, the
FOTM target of choice. They draw on a rich body of scholarship challenging FOTM’s efficacy vis-à-vis the goals of investor compensation
and fraud deterrence. The authors also discuss, and ultimately discard, emerging “corporate governance” justifications for FOTM. After
exposing its fatal weaknesses, Bratton and Wachter attempt to explain
FOTM’s stubborn persistence, pointing to both politics and the SEC’s
6
perceived resource constraints. These perceived resource constraints
led the Supreme Court to famously declare in its 1964 decision J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak that private enforcement is a “necessary supplement”
7
to the SEC’s efforts to enforce the securities laws. Whatever the truth
of that statement when written, the authors demonstrate that much
has changed in the intervening forty-seven years.
In this Response, I do not disagree with any of the core points
made in The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market. (My scholarship
has similarly emphasized the benefits of shifting away from FOTM to
8
greater reliance on public enforcement mechanisms.) Instead, I take
the opportunity to elaborate on the deterrence and governance
shortcomings of FOTM, strengthening further the case Bratton and
Wachter make for an enhanced public enforcement role. In conclusion, I suggest avenues for overcoming the political hurdles to
reform that the authors identify, so that we might someday actually
9
“get there from here.”
********
5

Id. at 166.
Id. at 103.
7
377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964).
8
See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence:
A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2176 (2010) [hereinafter Rose, The Multienforcer Approach] (evaluating the efficiency of the United States’ approach to securities
fraud deterrence, which utilizes federal regulators, state regulators, and class action
lawyers); Amanda M. Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301,
1307 (2008) [hereinafter Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform] (arguing for further exploration of SEC oversight of securities fraud class actions).
9
See Bratton and Wachter, supra note 1, at 107 (suggesting that, with regard to a
proposed movement from enterprise liability to individual liability, “no one seems able
to chart a plausible course that takes us from here to there”).
6
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Bratton and Wachter’s deterrence critique of FOTM proceeds in
four steps: (1) personal, not enterprise, liability is the best way to deter securities fraud, yet FOTM almost never results in individual contributions to settlement payments; (2) refocusing FOTM actions on
individual defendants would require a downward adjustment of sanctions, because otherwise it would produce unacceptable overdeterrence costs; (3) such a reduction in sanctions would drastically reduce
private incentives to bring suit; (4) ergo, we must tolerate the secondbest deterrent effects of the current FOTM regime or rely more heavily on public enforcement (the latter being the better option, in the
authors’ view). In this part, I provide a theoretical basis for the authors’ preference for individual liability, and suggest that private enforcement would remain inferior to public enforcement even if sufficient private incentives to bring suit remained after a downward
adjustment of FOTM sanctions.
I. THE THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH ENTERPRISE LIABILITY IN FOTM
The standard economic justification for enterprise liability begins
with the premise that personal liability will not deter socially harmful
conduct by firm agents if those agents are judgment-proof or are oth10
erwise resistant to liability incentives. But there are steps, the argument proceeds, that a firm (through its higher-level agents) can take
to help minimize the amount of social harm its agents cause in the
course of their employment—for example, careful employee selection
criteria, monitoring and supervision, or if all else fails, an adjustment
of the firm’s activity level. In the absence of enterprise liability, however, a firm’s owners would lack incentive to cause their firm to invest
in measures to prevent agents from imposing costs on third parties—
and they might in fact encourage such behavior if it would increase firm
profitability. Enterprise liability is therefore warranted, the argument
concludes, because it forces a firm’s owners to internalize fully the
costs their agents impose on third parties, incentivizing them to invest
socially optimal amounts of firm resources in internal deterrence
11
measures. What if firm agents are not resistant to liability incentives,
10

See Amanda M. Rose & Richard Squire, Intraportfolio Litigation, 105 NW. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 5-6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1769946.
11
For classic expositions of this argument, see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 6.8, at 188-90 (7th ed. 2007); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 230 (2004); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic
Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L.
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or are in fact overly sensitive to them? In those cases, the choice between enterprise and exclusive personal liability does not matter
much—the firm and its agents can bargain to an efficient allocation
12
of liability inter se.
This argument for enterprise liability is compelling in many situations. It is unconvincing, however, when used to defend corporate
liability for secondary market fraud, if we assume (as Bratton and
Wachter do) that most shareholders are well diversified. Scholars
have long asserted that well-diversified shareholders stand to pocket
gains as often as they sustain out-of-pocket losses from secondary market fraud, just as those shareholders are as likely to recover damages
in FOTM cases as to pay them through their ownership of the defendant firm. These assertions are commonly used to defeat the compensatory justification for FOTM. Less appreciated is that they also undermine its deterrence justification: the specter of damages in FOTM
actions will not change the incentives of diversified shareholders if
those shareholders face an equal likelihood of receiving as of paying
them. Corporate liability under these circumstances is simply ineffec13
tive as a cost-internalization technique. Nor is it necessary, given that
diversified shareholders naturally internalize many of the social costs
of fraud and thus have an incentive to deter it even in the absence of
14
corporate liability. As Professor Jack Coffee has colorfully observed,
corporate liability for secondary market fraud “is a strategy akin to
punishing the victims of burglary for their failure to take greater pre15
cautions.”
16
In a forthcoming essay titled Intraportfolio Litigation, Professor Richard Squire and I explain that an assumption of broad shareholder
diversification undermines the standard deterrence justification for
REV. 1345, 1345-46 (1982); Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE
L.J. 1231, 1246 (1984).
12
For example, if there were no enterprise liability but the firm could more efficiently bear a certain type of liability risk, then it could offer firm agents indemnity.
But see infra note 21.
13
As Bratton and Wachter explain, there are some “clear losers in the federal securities litigation game”—investors who can expect to pay more in damages through
their ownership of defendant firms than they can expect to receive as members of
FOTM classes. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 97. These include “mom-and-pop”
long-term investors, hardly a group well positioned to influence corporate behavior.
14
For a discussion of the social costs of fraud, see Rose, The Multienforcer Approach,
supra note 8, at 2179-80.
15
John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and
Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1562 (2006).
16
Rose & Squire, supra note 10 (manuscript at 11-13).
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corporate liability not only in the FOTM context, but also in any intercorporate dispute. I refer you to that piece for fuller exposition,
but the core idea can be simply stated: shareholders naturally want
firms in their portfolio to avoid imposing deadweight costs on other
firms in their portfolio, because such behavior would diminish their
overall wealth. Put differently, forcing one firm you own to pay damages to another firm you own in proportionate amount will do nothing to improve your incentives to invest in precautions ex ante—yet
the pocket-shifting exercise will cause you to incur transaction costs ex
post in the form of attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs. The
more shareholder portfolios expand to approximate the entire market, the less traction the standard deterrence justification for corporate liability has vis-à-vis intercorporate disputes.
We do not conclude from this that intercorporate litigation would
serve no purpose in a market dominated by broadly diversified shareholders. Instead, we identify a new justification for it, one focused on
protecting diversified shareholder interests. We call it the “informa17
tional theory” of corporate liability. We posit that although diversified shareholders care about maximizing portfolio value more than
the value of any individual portfolio firm, individual firm managers
have the opposite priority. Their compensation and future career
prospects are tied to firm rather than portfolio performance—the
higher their firm’s profits, the more valuable their incentive-based
pay, and the less likely they are to lose their jobs. Thus, corporate
managers might be tempted to boost profits by externalizing (and allowing their subordinate agents to externalize) costs onto other portfolio firms. Corporate liability can mitigate this conflict of interest by
ensuring that the firm’s reported profits will reflect its management
team’s true contribution to overall portfolio value, including damage
the firm’s agents have caused to other portfolio firms. Corporate liability, thus conceived, does not give diversified shareholders the incentive to take steps to deter wealth-destroying activity by corporate
agents—they already have that incentive if we are focused on firm-onfirm misconduct. Instead, it is a mechanism through which diversified
shareholders can act on that incentive. Although the costs of this mechanism are not trivial, shareholders might be willing to pay them if
corporate liability promised a greater reduction in residual portfoliolevel agency costs.

17

Id. (manuscript at 10).

ROSE FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

92

University of Pennsylvania Law Review PENNumbra

11/18/2011 8:08 PM

[Vol. 160:87

The informational theory of corporate liability advanced in Intraportfolio Litigation obviously relates to the nascent “corporate governance” justifications for FOTM that Bratton and Wachter discuss and
ultimately discard. Like those justifications, the informational theory
focuses on what a lawsuit promises to reveal to investors about the
quality of the defendant firm’s management team, and it supports a
shareholder right to opt out of corporate liability. But the informational theory—also like those justifications—lends little support to
18
FOTM at the end of the day. FOTM is unlikely to be a cost-justified
portfolio governance tool for a variety of reasons we discuss in our essay. Importantly, FOTM produces a relatively trivial amount of new
information about a firm’s management team. Fraud is seldom first
revealed through the initiation of FOTM litigation; in most instances, it
is ferreted out by the media or another source, and this alone is sufficient to cause the firm’s stock price to take a hit—a hit that tends to far
19
exceed the firm’s expected legal penalty. In light of this, it is difficult
to believe that the anticipated settlement payments in FOTM suits—
which are mostly funded by insurance anyway and thus have no immediate effect on the firm’s financials—have anything more than a very
20
marginal ex ante effect on managerial incentives. And if corporate
liability makes it easier for captured boards to insulate culpable officers
21
from personal liability, as it likely does, its ex ante effects on managerial incentives will be negative.
18

The informational theory presents a stronger defense for intercorporate liability
in other legal areas. See id. (manuscript at 20) (noting that the informational theory
may justify “[m]any lawsuits based on traditional common law causes of action”).
19

See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? 2 (Am. Fin.
Ass’n 2007 Chicago Meetings Paper, Chicago Booth Sch. Bus. Research Paper No. 0822, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891482 (finding that private litigation
accounted for only 3% of the alleged incidents of fraud between 1996 and 2004 in
companies with more than $750 million in assets); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost
to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 582 (2008) (finding that a firm’s reputational losses resulting from financial fraud “exceed[] the legal
penalty by over 7.5 times, and . . . the amount by which firm value was artificially inflated by more than 2.5 times”).
20
When insurers pay judgments (or settlements), it undermines the informational
value of corporate liability. This problem would be mitigated if insurers charged higher premiums to firms that have greater liability risk, as higher premiums would eat into
those firms’ reported profits. However, Professors Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith
have found that “there is not a large marginal difference between the . . . premium[]
paid by a well-governed firm relative to a poorly-governed firm . . . .” Tom Baker &
Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’
Liability Insurer, 95 GEO. L.J. 1795, 1821 (2007).
21
I noted earlier that the choice between enterprise liability and exclusive personal liability does not matter much when firm agents are not resistant to liability incen-
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I therefore agree with Bratton and Wachter that it would be better
to focus securities fraud liability on the culpable individuals, rather
than on the corporation that employs them. I also agree that doing so
would require a dramatic reduction in the currently nonsensical
22
measure of damages in FOTM suits, which if applied to individuals
would discourage any sane person from becoming a corporate executive. The following section explains why this is the case, and the reason highlights the advantage of public over private enforcement even if
private incentives to bring suit could be preserved in the wake of a
significant reduction in sanctions.
II. THE ADVANTAGE OF PUBLIC ENFORCEMENT
Securities fraud has no redeeming social value. Thus, absent a
risk of legal error, it is not an offense that requires a carefully calibrated sanction: society would be best served by creating very punitive
23
sanctions so as to eliminate any incentive to commit fraud. Unfortutives, because the firm and its agents can bargain to an efficient allocation of liability
inter se. A caveat is in order. Those who decide whether to shelter firm agents from
personal liability are themselves higher-level firm agents, and may not always act in
ways that maximize corporate wealth. Thus, a corporate board may choose to insulate
officers from personal liability, even when doing so increases the likelihood of fraud
and firm-level liability, without compensating reductions in overdeterrence costs. This
possibility exists regardless of whether there is enterprise liability or exclusive personal
liability: in a world with enterprise liability, the board might cause the defendant-firm
to settle the suit without requiring any contributions from individual wrongdoers (this
is typical in FOTM); in a world with exclusive personal liability, the board might cause
the firm to indemnify the individual wrongdoers for their settlement payments. But
state corporate law requires boards to make an affirmative determination that officers
are entitled to indemnity. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (mandating a determination that the defendant acted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation). No such affirmative judgment is necessary for the board to forgo seeking contribution. Thus, it is
less likely that boards would succumb to inappropriate pressures to indemnify than to
inappropriate pressures to cause the firm to shoulder the entire settlement payment.
22
See Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 8, at 1322-23 (critiquing
the damages measure used in 10b-5 cases).
23
Deterrence theory teaches that the law should assign a monetary sanction to
behavior equal to its social costs multiplied by the inverse of the probability that the
sanction will be imposed. SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 483. But a society may choose
not to recognize the utility derived from certain categories of illicit activities; the goal
of sanctions targeted at such activities would be to deter them unconditionally, rather
than to encourage potential defendants to weigh social costs against personal benefits.
A sanction of this sort may be set at an arbitrarily high level. See generally Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523 (1984). Notably, only individual
wrongdoers should be threatened with a sanction designed to unconditionally deter—
not the firm that employs them. This is because enterprise sanctions “in excess of the
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nately, there is a nontrivial risk of false positives in securities fraud
cases. Determining liability requires judges (and worse, juries) to evaluate the accuracy of statements (and worse, omissions) in hindsight,
and to infer from that and other circumstantial evidence the defendant’s intent to deceive. This can be incredibly difficult. It is the risk
of false positives, and not the risk of high sanctions alone, that leads to
24
the overdeterrence concerns that Bratton and Wachter raise —it is
cheap and easy for corporate officers not to lie, but to avoid being misjudged a liar, they may spend excessive corporate resources scrubbing
disclosures before they are made, or just keep quiet. Either course
hurts shareholders, and society more broadly, perhaps even more so
25
than securities fraud itself.
Profit-driven private enforcement exacerbates the risk of false positives. If the chance a judge or jury will decide a case in the plaintiff’s
favor is substantial enough to render the litigation a positive netpresent-value investment, a private enforcer may pursue the case even
if there is real doubt as to the defendant’s guilt. And potential defendants know this, and will adjust their behavior accordingly to avoid the
risk of being misjudged a fraudster. Lowering sanctions will reduce
the number of positive net-present-value litigation opportunities, and
hence the level of overdeterrence, assuming private enforcers’ compensation is tied to the sanction recovered (as it is today). But even
cases with a very high probability of success might not be worth the litigation expenses if sanctions are set too low. Bratton and Wachter see
this as a Catch-22: private enforcement cannot work in a FOTM regime that targets individuals, because, to avoid unacceptable overdeterrence costs, the sanctions would have to be set at a level too low to
incite any significant interest in private enforcement. The increased
underdeterrence costs that would result might overwhelm the savings in
overdeterrence costs. Hence, they conclude that increased public enforcement is necessary if we are to shift away from enterprise liability.
One could imagine, however, ways to decouple the plaintiff attorneys’ fees from the sanction the defendant pays—for example,
social cost of the crime (adjusted for the probability of nondetection) will cause the
private gains from monitoring to exceed the social gains,” leading to “an inefficiently
high level of investment in monitoring.” Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate
Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 324 (1996). This discussion therefore assumes a legal
regime that does not utilize enterprise liability.
24
See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 107-09.
25
See Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 8, at 2184 (explaining how
“overdeterrence produces some of the very same social costs as securities fraud” by increasing the cost of capital and upsetting the allocative efficiency of the economy).
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through public funding of private securities fraud litigation. Thinking
through how such funding would need to be structured reveals why
public enforcement would be a superior option even if sufficient private incentives to bring suit could be maintained after a downward adjustment of FOTM sanctions. A taxpayer-funded award of plaintiff attorneys’ fees would clearly have to be contingent on the lawyer’s
successful resolution of the case, via settlement or judgment at trial.
Moreover, the amount of the promised award would need to be set
high enough to incite “good” litigation (that is, litigation with a sufficiently high probability of success), but low enough to render marginal cases unattractive. This is necessary because even if securities fraud
26
sanctions are capped at the levels Bratton and Wachter suggest,
overdeterrence will remain a risk so long as officers face a nontrivial
possibility of legal error. Thus, discouraging borderline cases would
remain important, so as to keep overdeterrence costs in check. The
higher (or lower) the anticipated fee award is, the lower (or higher)
the probability of success necessary to render the litigation attractive
to a private enforcer. Set the award too high, and overdeterrence
costs may swamp the savings in underdeterrence costs; set the award
too low, and risk the opposite.
How easy would it be to arrive at such a Goldilocks figure in the
real world? The fact is that using money to incent securities enforce27
ment is fraught with difficulties. These difficulties could be avoided
if the enforcer were motivated not by money but by a desire to maxim28
ize social welfare. Instead of looking to a rigid and imprecise financial proxy to determine if a case is worth pursuing, such an enforcer
would directly consider the expected benefits of the suit in terms of
future savings in underdeterrence costs and weigh those benefits
against the expected enforcement costs—including the overdeterrence costs the suit might generate.
Of course, it would be naïve to presume that the SEC’s enforcement choices are always the product of such a calculation, or that such
calculations are always accurate when made. The SEC is staffed by
26

Bratton & Wachter, supra note 1, at 107 (suggesting “a fine capped at $5, $10,
$20, or $30 million, or, alternatively, a fine set at a percentage of individual net worth”
depending on the size of the company and its level of executive pay).
27
Policymakers could try to reduce the risk of false positives in more direct ways as
well, such as by narrowing the scope of the fraud prohibition or increasing procedural
hurdles to bringing successful suits. As I have detailed elsewhere, however, these blunt
maneuvers come at a cost, for they weed out meritorious suits as well as nonmeritorious
ones. See Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 8, at 2184-88, 2192-93.
28
See id. at 2194-97.
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human beings who may sometimes fail to act in the public interest
and who will naturally make mistakes. But the proper question is not
whether the incentives and abilities of SEC staffers are perfect, but
whether those staffers are likely to do a better job at getting the delicate deterrence calculus right than would profit-driven private enforc29
ers. I believe that they are—or at least that they could be. There are
a variety of tools available for better aligning the incentives of bureaucrats, including those at the SEC, with the public interest. Moreover,
many of the offsetting benefits that we normally associate with private
enforcement—such as detection advantages and meaningful victim
30
compensation—are not produced in the FOTM context.
Thus, I agree with Bratton and Wachter that FOTM should be
scrapped in favor of public enforcement not because a reduction in
sanctions would render a private enforcement regime infeasible, but
because I believe public enforcement could do a better job even if private enforcement remained a viable alternative. And I would encourage policymakers to couple the shift away from FOTM and toward
public enforcement not only with an increase in the SEC’s budget, as
Bratton and Wachter suggest, but also with reforms designed to better
31
align the incentives of SEC personnel with the public interest.
CONCLUSION
In The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, Professors Bratton
and Wachter build a compelling case for scrapping the securities
fraud class action that has long been derided in the academic literature and shifting to increased reliance on public enforcement mechanisms. I am convinced. But Bratton and Wachter also describe
the formidable political barriers that exist to implementing this policy
shift, without offering any real suggestions for how to overcome them.
That is understandable. Their article is already extremely ambitious
in its breadth. In this conclusion, I offer my preliminary thoughts on
29

See Rose, Reforming Securities Litigation Reform, supra note 8, at 1343 (observing
that correcting the misalignment between profit-driven private enforcers’ incentives
and the public interest “may be more difficult than—or at least as difficult as—
monitoring the [SEC] for capture or regulatory inefficiency”).
30
See, e.g., SHAVELL, supra note 11, at 578-80 (discussing detection advantages as a
factor weighing in favor of private enforcement). The SEC’s new Whistleblower Bounty Program may prove to be a more effective way to generate private information about
securities fraud than FOTM. See Office of the Whistleblower, SEC.GOV, http://www.
sec.gov/whistleblower (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
31
For a discussion of possible reforms to better the SEC, see Rose, The Multienforcer Approach, supra note 8, at 2224-27.
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how we might “get there from here,” the logical next question scholars in this field must confront.
Bratton and Wachter tell a sad story about the persistence of
FOTM. That story involves politicians who place special interests
above the social welfare—namely, the interests of attorneys who directly profit from FOTM and those of the “management class” who
benefit because FOTM helps to insulate them from personal liability.
These politicians get away with their malefaction because the public
suffers from the illusion that FOTM is a vehicle for challenging the
privileged status of corporate managers and for vindicating shareholder interests, when in fact it serves to protect managers at the expense of shareholders.
If their story is correct, the only way forward involves breaking the
illusion. That means educating shareholders (and perhaps misguided
but well-meaning politicians) about the reality of FOTM, and convincing them of the superiority of the public enforcement option so that
they might use their clout to pressure Congress for reform. Articles
like The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market are an important step in
this regard, but only if they are read outside the ivory towers of academia. Scholars writing in this field should expand the names on
their reprint lists to include policymakers, shareholder activists, and
institutional money managers—including those who run hedge funds,
mutual funds, and public pension funds. We should invite them to
our conferences and seek to keep an open dialogue with them. Perhaps we also have something to learn from them about hidden benefits of FOTM, or hidden dangers of public enforcement. To be sure,
the groups I mention face their own conflicts of interest, but they may
be the best shot we have at actually improving upon the status quo.
And if that isn’t a viable goal, what’s the point?

Preferred Citation: Amanda M. Rose, Response, Fraud on the Market:
An Action Without a Cause, 160 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 87 (2011),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2011/Rose.pdf.

